We argue that phishing IQ tests fail to measure susceptibility to phishing attacks. We conducted a study where 40 subjects were asked to answer a selection of questions from existing phishing IQ tests in which we varied the portion (from 25% to 100%) of the questions that corresponded to phishing emails. We did not find any correlation between the actual number of phishing emails and the number of emails that the subjects indicated were phishing. Therefore, the tests did not measure the ability of the subjects. To further confirm this, we exposed all the subjects to existing phishing education after they had taken the test, after which each subject was asked to take a second phishing test, with the same design as the first one, but with different questions. The number of stimuli that were indicated as being phishing in the second test was, again, independent of the actual number of phishing stimuli in the test. However, a substantially larger portion of stimuli was indicated as being phishing in the second test, suggesting that the only measurable effect of the phishing education (from the point of view of the phishing IQ test) was an increased concern-not an increased ability.
Introduction
Popular media routinely covers the mounting problem of phishing. Financial institutions frequently alert clients of the risks of identity theft, and many provide detailed descriptions of common attacks and how to avoid falling victim to these. With this popular focus on the problem, we must ask ourselves why the recent trends show an increase in the number of people that fall victim to phishing. Furthermore, we must pose the question whether current educational efforts are meaningful and whether ways in which vulnerabilities are assessed work.
To be able to ask these questions, it is important first to understand why phishing works. This question has been asked by several researchers recently [5, 6, 7, 18] , and a collection of insightful conclusions have been found. One reason that phishing works is that most people do not have a detailed understanding of all the guises a given threat might take, but only react to situations that he or she has already identified as being dangerous. Another reason is that many users do not possess the technical sophistication sufficient to verify whether a given email or webpage corresponds to an attempt to defraud them. The most important reason of all, though, might be that to most people, security is a secondary goal. In other words, the average person may very well ignore signs of risk, since he or she is not actively looking for these.
There are publicly available 'phishing IQ tests' published to help individuals assess their likely vulnerability to phishing scams. Examples of these can be found at Mailfrontier/Sonicwall [11, 14] ; Mailfrontier also has UK and German versions [13, 12] . These tests typically take the form of a sequence of e-mail screen shots depicting messages of the sort phishers tend to emulate. Users identify the depicted message as either a legitimate message or a phishing scam, and receive a score based on the percentage of correct answers. We argue that such phishing IQ tests are flawed on several levels. Due to their delivery format, a static file, many actual security indicators are not available. By their nature these tests also lack context present in real attacks and which can aid in making accurate decisions. In addition, and more importantly to our study, while the natural context is lacking, an artificial context may skew the test taker's judgment. This may create a false sense of security among test takers who are receive a high score on the tests. As we will show, obtaining a high score is not an indication of ability to recognize phishing attempts.
Because it is in the context of a test regarding the taker's ability to correctly identify phishing, test takers may be suspicious beyond the level they normally would upon seeing the original email in their inbox. This could simultaneously mean that they correctly label some examples as phishing that they might normally be susceptible to, and/or would incorrectly identify legitimate emails as phishing. This is a well understood fact, but does not in any way affect our methodology. Quite to the contrary, we are to some extent able to quantify the effects of this type of bias; this is done by comparing the average ratings given by subjects before and after the educational step of the experiment.
We are also able to show that traditional forms of education [8] increase the level of fear or concern among users, but that they became no better at passing the phishing IQ tests.
Previous Work
Much of the existing literature related to phishing deals with people's perception of website credibility and not with how people judge the emails which lure them to the fake websites. There has been a substantial amount of work in the direction of what makes a website credible or phishy to the people.
Fogg et al [6, 7] conducted a study with over 2500 subjects and investigated how different elements of websites affect people's perception of credibility and laid down guidelines for the credible perception of websites. On similar lines, Dhamija et al [5] worked towards establishing what makes phishing websites credible and why phishing works. In another user study which dealt with the effectiveness of anti-phishing measures such as phishing toolbars, Wu et al [18] . examined the impact of anti-phishing toolbars in preventing phishing attacks.
Several other studies have recently shed light on the problem of phishing [1, 5, 9, 10, 16, 19] and several have proposed countermeasures [2, 4, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18] . Moreover, researchers have become increasingly interested in the role of malware in the context of phishing [3] .
Many of these papers fail to recognize that although it is not commonly happening today, the various indicators of security which are emphasized can be spoofed by phishers (see, e.g., [5] ). Thus, sophisticated phishing attacks may be difficult to detect, even to people who are reasonably aware of what to look for. It is also worth mentioning that the multitude of studies which perform general evaluations of phishing vulnerabilities largely neglect the subject-expectancy effect.The subject-expectancy effect is a cognitive bias that occurs when a subject expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or reports the expected result, partly to avoid embarrassment. This effect is applicable to phishing IQ tests (e.g., [11] ), where the cognizance of being involved in a phishing IQ test makes the subjects unusually suspicious and this can substantially skew the results of the test.
There have been no previous attempts to gather any empirical data on the effectiveness of these phishing IQ tests.
Experiment and Results
We did a test on 40 subjects for this data analysis. As our study asks about how an average user performs at the task, we excluded subjects with an unusual knowledge of computer science or security, and asked that subjects be people who either use or would consider using online shopping, banking, or bill paying.
A first phishing IQ test. For the first part of the experiment, we gave subjects a short sample test with five screenshots in which we varied the number of those screenshots corresponding to actual phishing emails. Our hypothesis predicted that the portion of screenshots subjects labeled as suspicious would be roughly the same regardless of the group of the subject (i.e., independent of how many screenshots were "bad").
Phishing education. After the first sample test, we gave the subjects time to read over an example of phishing education intended for the layman. We used the education material available at ftc.gov [8] A second phishing IQ test, and analysis. After the educational step, a second phishing IQ test was administered. This contained 5 stimuli diferent from what the subject saw in the first phishing IQ test. It is evident that this is not the case. Note also the effect of the education: Subjects were not better at taking the second test than the first; however, they were more suspicious of all stimuli shown during the second test and hence falsely labeled many legitimate stimuli as phish. Figure 1 shows, among other things, how many of the examples they were shown that subjects labeled as phishing, and the number required to get a perfect score. It can be seen that the experiments support the hypotheses described above.
Consistent with our first hypothesis, the number of times subjects labeled an example as phishing appears to have no correlation with the number of actual phishing examples they were shown. The individual responses have a practically zero linear correlation coeffecient with the number of actual phishing examples, suggesting that the number of times a subject labels an example as phishing does not depend on the number that actually are phishing. Figure 1 also shows how many of the stimuli subjects labeled as phishing in the post-education test, compared to the actual number shown. This time, we see the overestimation we predicted in our hypothesis; after reading about how to identify phishing, subjects started seeing more instances of phishing than were necessarily there.
In the short term at least, the education does appear to affect the subjects' judgment, but more in terms of making them more suspicious than in improving their ability to distinguish phishing from legitimate emails. The number of times that subjects labeled a stimulus as phishing increased from the first to the second test for most subjects, even though two of the four groups were actually shown fewer instances in the second round than in the first; however, the number of instances labeled as phishing still did not correlate with the number which were phishing.
